Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union by Lane, P
Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union
Trinity Economic Paper Series
Technical Paper No. 99/4







We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face
of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization prop-
erties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements
and show how the relative performance of a currency union depends on the
extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production
and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment
stability in the monetary authority’s objective function. Keywords: mon-
etary union, stabilization.
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The conduct of monetary stabilization policy in a currency union
has not received much research attention.1 This is surprising, given that
an understanding of this issue is highly relevant in comparing a currency
union to alternative exchange rate arrangements. Although comparing the
stabilization properties of …xed and ‡exible exchange rate systems is an
activity with a long tradition in international macroeconomics, the option
of a currency union has not been formally analyzed in this literature. In
recent years, the instability of …xed exchange rate systems has suggested
the possibility that the only viable long-term options for a country are
a ‡oating exchange rate or participation in a currency union (Obstfeld
1995, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1995, Persson and Tabellini 1995). If this is
the case, it is important to gain a greater understanding of the monetary
stabilization properties of a currency union.
In this paper, our focus is on the stabilization problem of ad-
justment in response to asymmetric shocks. Asymmetric shocks arguably
have been the impulse behind the collapse of most …xed exchange rate
systems. The need to …nance the Vietnam war in part motivated the US
monetary expansion that triggered the collapse of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem; the German reuni…cation shock ultimately forced the exit of Britain
and Italy from the ERM in 1992 and a sharp widening of the ‡uctuation
bands for the remaining members in 1993. Indeed, empirical attempts to
1But see Alesina and Grilli (1992) for a reduced-form model. Other aspects of mon-
etary policy, especially setting the operational goal (an in‡ation target versus a money
target), have been more extensively studied.
1evaluate the suitability of various regions for currency unions have focused
on the prevalence of asymmetric shocks as a key indicator of whether a re-
gion quali…es as an optimal currency area (see Bayoumi and Eichengreen
1992).
We consider only monetary policy as a stabilization tool. By
adopting this strategy, we ignore alternative potential stabilization policies
such as …scal transfers and encouraging intra-union labor mobility. By
ruling out non-monetary stabilization policies, this means our analysis
will establish a lower bound to the stabilization potential of a currency
union.
The model developed in this paper is a standard two-country
monetary model, as employed by Canzoneri and Henderson (1985, 1991).2
Although, Canzoneri and Henderson employed this framework to compare
the stabilization properties of alternative exchange rate systems, they did
not consider the currency union case. Accordingly, the main contribu-
tion of this paper is to extend the analysis of monetary stabilization pol-
icy to incorporate the currency union case. In addition, Canzoneri and
Henderson consider only a common productivity shock and an asymmet-
ric demand shock. Our approach is more general in that we also allow
for velocity shocks and permit disturbances to be common, national (i.e.
country-speci…c) or asymmetric.
In terms of stabilization policy, the key characteristic of a cur-
2Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (1995) write a multi-country core-periphery version of
the model. In what follows, we focus on the standard two-country case but it would
clearly be of interest to extend the analysis to a multi-country framework. Persson and
Tabellini (1995) lay out a generalized approach to analyzing interdependence issues.
2rency union is that the union-wide money supply can be targeted but that
the allocation of money across countries within the union cannot. We as-
sume the currency union’s monetary authority sets monetary policy to
minimize the weighted sum of the loss functions of the monetary author-
ities of the member countries. We show that it turns out that the best
response of the monetary authority of a currency union to asymmetric
demand shocks is to leave unchanged the union-wide money supply, or
“do nothing”. This policy generates ine¢ciently large ‡uctuations in out-
put and in‡ation in the member countries, even if union-wide aggregate
output and in‡ation display zero volatility. However, monetary policy in
a currency union does respond to aggregate productivity shocks, even if
the shock is not equally large in both regions, and it is this responsiveness
that distinguishes a currency union from a symmetric …xed exchange rate
arrangement. Given the model’s structure, there is no need to respond
to aggregate demand shocks, since these are absorbed by adjustment in
the real interest rate without any change in employment or price levels.
Moreover, velocity shocks do not pose a stabilization problem, since it
is optimal and feasible to fully accommodate velocity shocks in all the
regimes we consider.
In addition to these analytical results, we quantitatively com-
pare stabilization performance, as measured by the loss functions of the
monetary authorities, in a currency union in response to various shocks
versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. A quantitative approach
has the virtue of measuring relative performance across regimes. This
allows us to gain insight into whether the regime choice “matters” in any
3substantive way for stabilization performance. Moreover, such an exercise
is important in order to understand how changes in key parameters a¤ect
the attractiveness of a currency union, relative to other exchange rate ar-
rangements. For instance, it is of interest to know the e¤ects of greater
economic integration on the relative desirability of a currency union in
terms of stabilization performance.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section
2, the model is laid out. The structure is adapted from Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991), so the presentation of the basic details will be relatively
brief.3 As aprelude to the analysis of a currency union, we analyze optimal
monetary policy under alternative exchange rate arrangements in section
3. In section 4, monetary policy in a currency union is studied. Section 5
develops the comparative results on stabilization performance. Section 6
concludes.
Section II: The Model
A : Basic Structure
In this section, we describe the basic structure of the model
world economy. All variables, except for interest rates, are in logs and are
expressed as deviations from a no-shock equilibrium. Home and foreign
supply schedules are given by
3Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) analyze a common productivity shock and an asym-
metric shock. Our approach is more general in that we also consider velocity disturbances
and allow shocks to be common, country-speci…c or asymmetric.
4y = (1 ¡ ®)n + a; y¤ = (1 ¡ ®)n¤ + a¤ ® 2 (0;1) (1)
where y;y¤ are home and foreign levels of output, n;n¤ are home and
foreign levels of employment and a;a¤ are home and foreign productivity
shocks with mean zero and …nite variance. The assumption of diminishing
returns to labor implies labor demand schedules are negatively sloped
w ¡ p = a ¡ ®n; w¤ ¡ p¤ = a¤ ¡ ®n¤ (2)
where w;w¤ are home and foreign wage rates and p;p¤ are home and
foreign output prices. Output demands are a function of relative prices,
the real interest rate and a stochastic term
y = ±z ¡ vr + ¸; y¤ = ¡±z ¡ vr¤ + ¸
¤ ±;v > 0 (3)
where z is the real exchange rate, r;r¤ are the home and foreign real
interest rates and ¸;¸¤ represent demand shocks for home and foreign
goods respectively. The parameter ± can be interpreted as indexing the
degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods: a large value
of ± means that relative demands are highly sensitive to relative prices,
indicating that home and foreign products are good substitutes.
The real exchange rate z is de…ned as the relative price of the
foreign good in terms of the domestic good, in units of the domestic cur-
rency. Let s be the number of domestic currency units per unit of foreign
currency. Then
z ´ p¤ + s ¡ p (4)
5The real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate minus the expected
rate of in‡ation. If q;q¤ are the home and foreign consumer price levels,
the home and foreign real interest rates are
r = i ¡ (Eq+1 ¡ q); r¤ = i¤ ¡ (Eq¤
+1 ¡ q¤) (5)
where E denotes the expectations operator and i;i¤ are the home and
foreign nominal interest rates. These are linked by uncovered interest
rate parity
i = i¤ + Es+1 ¡ s (6)
Let ¯ be the share of foreign (home) goods in home (foreign) consumption.
Then the home and foreign consumer price in‡ation rates q;q¤ are given
by
q = (1¡¯)p+¯(p¤+s) = p+¯z; q¤ = (1¡¯)(p¤+s)+¯p = p¤¡¯z (7)
We restrict the value of ¯ to lie in the interval 0 < ¯ < 1=2, which
implies a home bias in consumption. Finally, only domestic residents hold
domestic money.4 Money demand is assumed to be proportional to income
so that monetary equilibrium requires that
m = · + p + y = · + w + n; m¤ = ·¤ + p¤ + y¤ = ·¤ + w¤ + n¤ (8)
where ·;·¤ are velocity shocks.
In order to allow for a stabilization role for monetary policy, we
4For instance, this could be the result of a legal restriction requiring the use of do-
mestic currency for domestic transactions.
































assume that wages are determined one period in advance. Since no shocks
are anticipated, labor unions set w = 0 and employment ‡uctuations are
driven by monetary surprises
n = m ¡ ·; n¤ = m¤ ¡ ·¤ (9)
In words, a positive domestic (foreign) monetary surprise raises domestic
(foreign) employment. In contrast, anticipated changes in the money sup-
ply have zero impact on real variables, in the presence of forward-looking
wage-setters. Using [4], [5] and [6], and imposing a no-bubble terminal
condition as a boundary restriction,we can write the real exchange rate as
z = (1 ¡ ®)¼(n ¡ n¤) + ¼(a ¡ a¤) ¡ ¼(¸ ¡ ¸
¤) (10)
where ¼ is de…ned in Table 1.
Finally, from [2] and [10], we can write the home and foreign
7consumer price levels as
q = ®n ¡ a + ¯z; q¤ = ®n¤ ¡ a¤ ¡ ¯z (11)
The dependence of the consumer price level on the real exchange rate
means that it cannot be perfectly controlled by the domestic monetary
authority alone. This sensitivity of the domestic price level to foreign
output constitutes the key international spillover e¤ect in the model. This
externality underlies the ine¢ciency of uncoordinated monetary policies.
Finally, the nominal exchange rate is determined by
s = p¡p¤+z = [®+(1¡®)¼](n¡n¤)¡¼(¸¡¸¤)¡(1¡¼)(a¡a¤) (12)
This completes the description of the model’s structure. We now turn to
the determination of monetary policy.
B : Monetary Policy













That is to say, the monetary authority dislikes variance in employment
and price levels, with a relative weight on price stability of ¾. This spec-
i…cation is standard in the monetary stabilization literature. Notice that
it is straightforward in the model to perfectly stabilize employment. All
the monetary authority needs to do is to guarantee a perfectly predictable
8path for the money supply.5 However, keeping employment …xed would
make the monetary authority unable to o¤set the in‡ation e¤ects of de-
mand shocks by inducing countervailing movements in employment.
The loss functions given in [13] do not contain an in‡ation bias in
that the monetary authority wishes to stabilize (log) employment around
its steady-state value of zero. This is in contrast to the in‡ation-determination
literature initiated by Barro and Gordon (1983), in which the market-
determined level of output is perceived as too low by policymakers. In
the presence of an in‡ation bias, Rogo¤ (1985a) shows that international
monetary coordination can increase the steady-state rate of in‡ation by
eliminating real depreciation as a consequence of monetary expansion and
hence lowering the costs of in‡ation to the policymaker. We rule out this
e¤ect in order to focus more clearly on the issue of stabilization in re-
sponse to asymmetric disturbances: in the no-shock case, the monetary





[(m ¡ ·)2 (14)
+¾((® + ¯(1 ¡ ®)¼)(m ¡ ·) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)¼n¤ ¡ a




[(m¤ ¡ ·¤)2 (15)
+¾((® + ¯(1 ¡ ®)¼)(m¤ ¡ ·¤) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)¼n ¡ a¤
¡¯¼(a ¡ a¤) + ¯¼(¸ ¡ ¸
¤))2]
5A stable money supply …xes employment only if velocity is constant. We discuss
velocity shocks later in this subsection.
9Notice that it is automatic that optimal monetary policies will fully ac-
commodate velocity shocks, since this achieves employment stabilization
without sacri…cing price stability. For this reason, in what follows we
ignore velocity disturbances and treat the monetary authority as being
able to perfectly control employment (n = m ¡ ·). Of course, velocity
shocks are a potentially important source of ‡uctuations under a money-
targeting rule or if it is di¢cult to quickly identify the occurrence of a
velocity disturbance. However, a money-targeting rule is not generally
optimal and so falls outside the scope of this paper and we assume full
information on the part of the monetary authorities about the identity of
shocks.
In section 3, as a prelude to the analysis of a currency union,
we consider di¤erent types of exchange rate arrangements. This is done
in order to provide comparators for the relative performance evaluations
in section 5 and to illustrate the relationship between the stabilization
properties of a currency union and more familiar types of exchange rate
systems.
First, we examine a ‡exible exchange rate system. Next, we turn
to the analysis of …xed exchange rate arrangements. Finally, in this sec-
tion, we consider a cooperative regime in which national monetary policies
are chosen to maximize global welfare. In each case, we present the solu-
tion to the decision problem of the monetary authority, which determines
the output and in‡ation e¤ects of asymmetric shocks. In section 4, we
study the operation of a currency union in a similar fashion.
10Section III: Alternative Exchange Rate Systems
In analyzing adjustment to shocks under various exchange rate
regimes, we follow the Aoki (1981) solution method by which the global
shift in employment (n+n¤) and the asymmetric shift (n¡n¤) are derived.
In combination, these two expressions determine n and n¤ and q and q¤
are easily obtained from [11] once n and n¤ are known.
A : Floating Exchange Rate Regime
In a ‡oating exchange rate regime, the home and foreign mone-
tary authorities choose their policies independently. Optimization yields
the monetary policies
n = Á0n¤+Á1a+Á2(¸¡¸¤)¡Á2(a¡a¤); n¤ = Á0n+Á1a¤¡Á2(¸¡¸¤)+Á2(a¡a¤)
(16)
where Á0; Á1 and Á2 are given in Table 1. From [16], we can write
n ¡ n¤ =
Á1 ¡ 2Á2
1 + Á0





n + n¤ =
Á1
1 ¡ _ Á0
(a + a¤) (18)
Notice that aggregate world employment (n + n¤) responds only to ag-
gregate productivity shocks; aggregate demand shocks are rather fully
absorbed by adjustment in real interest rates (see Lane 1996). These
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(a ¡ a¤) ¡
Á2
1 + Á0
(¸ ¡ ¸¤) (20)
at is to say, in the ‡oating exchange rate equilibrium, domestic monetary
expansion and foreign monetary contraction causes home employment to
increase in response to a positive shock but foreign employment to con-
tract. The intuition is that the domestic monetary authority increases
domestic output in order to o¤set the de‡ationary impact of real appre-
ciation on the domestic price level; symmetrically, the foreign monetary
authority contracts foreign output in order to o¤set the in‡ationary im-
pact of real depreciation on the foreign price level.
B : Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
We consider two types of pegged exchange rate system. In
an asymmetric …x, the leader country chooses its monetary policy au-
tonomously in the knowledge that the follower country will respond by
adjusting its monetary policy in order to maintain the nominal exchange
rate peg. We can think of the US during the Bretton Woods system and
Germany in the EMS as playing the role of leader. In a symmetric …x, in
contrast, each country adjusts equally in order to maintain the peg: this
is akin to the system outlined by McKinnon (1984).
0.0.1 Asymmetric Fix
We assume without loss of generality that the home country is the leader
country. In the home-leadership case, from [12], the nominal exchange
rate commitment s = 0 implies the rule for foreign monetary policy
12n¤ = n ¡ °0(¸ ¡ ¸
¤) ¡ °1(a ¡ a¤) (21)
where °0 and °1 are shown in Table 1. The home monetary authority
incorporates the reaction function [21] into its optimization problem. The
solution is
n = º0a ¡ v1(¸ ¡ ¸
¤) ¡ v2(a ¡ a¤) (22)
n¤ = v0a ¡ (v1 + °0)(¸ ¡ ¸¤) ¡ (v2 + °1)(a ¡ a¤) (23)
where v0; v1 and v2 are shown in Table 1. Notice that in this case, the
domestic productivity shock a is in e¤ect the “aggregate” shock since the
home (leader) country is not directly concerned with the impact of foreign
productivity shocks. Second, the home monetary authority minimizes the
response of domestic employment to asymmetric shocks by shifting the
burden of adjustment onto foreign employment.
0.0.2 Symmetric Fix
In a symmetric …x, each country takes equal responsibility for maintaining
the …xed nominal exchange rate. Equal responsibility means that the
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°0(¸ ¡ ¸¤) ¡
1
2
°1(a ¡ a¤) (25)
In this case, home and foreign employment do not respond to aggregate
shocks, since monetary policies are entirely dedicated to maintaining the
13…xed nominal exchange rate.
C : Cooperation
In a cooperative regime, each monetary authority internalizes
the impact of its policies on the welfare of the other country. In other











Following similar solution techniques to the previous cases, we obtain
n + n¤ = Â0(a + a¤) (26)
n ¡ n¤ = Â1(¸ ¡ ¸
¤) + Â2(a ¡ a¤) (27)















Â0(a + a¤) ¡
1
2
Â1(¸ ¡ ¸¤) ¡
1
2
Â2(a ¡ a¤) (29)
The presentation of alternative exchange rate arrangements is now com-
plete. In the next section, we turn to the currency union case.
Section IV: Currency Union
By its de…nition, there is but a single monetary policy for a cur-
rency union.6 We assume the monetary authority of the currency union
cares equally about the home and foreign countries: this is a natural as-
6See Lane (1996) for more details about the derivation of this case.
14sumption and could be generated, for example, by a central bank board
with representatives from each member country that bargained over mon-
etary policy decisions.7 Accordingly, it chooses mcu to minimize the loss
function8




n2 + n¤2 + ¾[q2 + q¤2]
´
(30)
Home and foreign employment are linked together by the real exchange
rate equation [10] and the monetary equilibrium condition
mcu = n + n¤ + - (31)
where - = · + ·¤ is the aggregate velocity shock. The monetary au-
thority recognizes that it can only a¤ect aggregate employment and not
the distribution of employment between the home and foreign countries.
Accordingly, it recognizes that (n ¡ n¤) is implicitly given by [21].9 In
turn, [21] and [31] imply that n and n¤ are determined by
n = mcu ¡ -=2 + ¡=2 (32)
n¤ = mcu ¡ -=2 ¡ ¡=2 (33)
7In this respect, the objective function of the currency union’s monetary authority
resembles that in the cooperative arrangement. However, in the cooperative arrange-
ment, two instruments are available to the policymakers: the money supplies of the two
member countries. In contrast, the currency union’s monetary authority has available
to it just one policy instrument: a single union-wide money supply.
8It is straightforward to show that the same results are obtained when the monetary
union cares only about average employment and average in‡ation in the currency union.
In this case the loss function would be lcu = 1=2((nt+nt¤)2 + ¾(q + q¤)2).
9This equation is derived from the real exchange rate equation [3.6] and the fact
that the real exchange rate in a currency union (or under a peg) is just z = p¤ ¡ p =
®(n ¡ n¤) ¡ (a ¡ a¤).
15where
¡ ´ °0(¸ ¡ ¸
¤) + °1(a ¡ a¤)
Equations [32]-[33] are obtained from the two relationships that link home
and foreign employment: the real exchange rate equation [10] and the
monetary equilibrium condition [31]. Replacing [31], [32] and [33] into
[30], we obtain
lcu = 1=2f(mcu ¡ -=2 + ¡=2)2 + (mcu ¡ -=2 ¡ ¡=2)2+
¾(®mcu ¡ ®- + ®¡=2 ¡ a + ¯z)2 + ¾(®mcu ¡ ®- ¡ ®¡=2 ¡ a¤ ¡ ¯z)2g
(34)
It is straightforward to work out that the solution to this minimization
problem is
mcu = - + ª(a + a¤) (35)
where ª is in Table 1. In words, optimal monetary policy in a currency
union fully accommodates velocity shocks (- 6= 0) and also responds to
aggregate productivity shocks (a + a¤ 6= 0). From [31], the deviation in
aggregate employment is given by the size of the monetary expansion (net
of velocity shocks)
n + n¤ = ª(a + a¤) (36)
In essence, the monetary authority acts as if it cares only about aggregate
‡uctuations, even though the members of the currency union also care
about local shocks. A result of this type is implicit in the reduced form
analysis of Alesina and Grilli (1991). Again, monetary policy responds
only to aggregate productivity shocks since aggregate demand shocks are
fully absorbed by adjustment in the real interest rate.
16From [21], we can write relative employment as
n ¡ n¤ = °0(¸ ¡ ¸¤) + °1(a ¡ a¤) (37)
Even if monetary policy (and hence aggregate employment) does not re-
spond to purely asymmetric shocks, the composition of employment will
change, with a reallocation between home and foreign countries. From
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(a + a¤) ¡
1
2
°0(¸ ¡ ¸¤) ¡
1
2
°1(a ¡ a¤) (39)
Notice that this solution is quite similar to the solution to the symmet-
ric …xed exchange rate case. However, a crucial di¤erence is that home
and foreign employment now respond to aggregate productivity shocks:
the common monetary authority is able to react to such aggregate dis-
turbances whereas the symmetric …xed exchange rate system precludes
adjustment to common shocks. Notice also that the response to a purely
symmetric productivity shock (a = a¤) is exactly the same as under a
cooperative regime or an asymmetric …x (ª = Â0 = v0 in Table 1).
Section V: Relative Performance
Comparing across regimes, the following general results hold.
First, a currency union dominates a symmetric …x in terms of its stabi-
lization properties: although both deliver the same outcome in the event
of asymmetric shocks, a currency union also provides stabilization in re-
17sponse to common productivity shocks. Second, the ‡exible exchange
rate case typically generates a lower expected loss than under a currency
union. This con…rms the intuition that ‡exibility in the exchange rate is
helpful in adjusting to shocks. Third, the follower country prefers a cur-
rency union to an asymmetric …x but the ranking is reversed for the leader
country. Finally, a currency union achieves the same outcome as a coop-
erative regime in the case of common productivity shocks but otherwise
performs worse in terms of stabilization performance.
However, these qualitative results do not indicate the size of
the performance gaps between regimes, nor how they vary with changes
in key parameters. These considerations are especially important in the
context of the decision to form a currency union, as policymakers must
weigh relative stabilization performance against other economic and polit-
ical dimensions of the regime choice and hence require some quantitative
guidance.
A : Benchmark Simulations
Using numerical analysis, we compare stabilization performance
across regimes in response to various shocks, where the shocks are nor-
malized to be of unit magnitude. We consider both productivity and
demand shocks. In each case, we present (i) asymmetric shocks (a =
¡a¤ = 1; or ¸ = ¡¸
¤ = 1); (ii) idiosyncratic (“national”) shocks
(a = 1 and a¤ = 0; or ¸ = 1 and ¸
¤ = 0); and (iii) common shocks
(a = a¤ = 1; or ¸ = ¸
¤ = 1). We initially report results for a benchmark
set of parameters. We also examine the sensitivity of relative stabilization
18Table 2: Realized Losses
(a;a¤) (¸;¸¤)
(1,-1) (1,0) (1,1) (1,-1) (1,0) (1,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LCU 0.46 1.22 2.36 0.93 0.23 0.00
LFLEX 0.34 0.93 1.83 0.34 0.085 0.00
LLEAD 0.44 1.21 2.36 0.068 0.02 0.00
LFOLL 0.52 1.23 2.36 3.51 0.88 0.00
LSYMM 0.46 1.43 3.00 0.93 0.23 0.00
LCOOP 0.33 1.09 2.36 0.33 0.083 0.00
performance to changes in key parameters in the model. In particular, it
is important to consider the e¤ects of greater economic integration on
relative performance under di¤erent exchange rate arrangements.
The benchmark parameter values for the simulations are as fol-
lows. Relative to Taylor (1993), which is a world economy model, we
increase ¯, the share of imports in consumption, from 0.2 to 0.3 and ±,
the sensitivity of demand to the real exchange rate, from 0.1 to 0.5 in or-
der to increase the degree of trade integration between the two economies,
to better re‡ect linkages within, say, the European Union. We follow Hen-
derson and McKibbin (1993) in choosing a value of 0.3 for ®, which implies
a 1 percent increase in output requires a 1.42 percent increase in employ-
ment, and by setting v = 0:5: a one point increase in the real interest
rate decreases demand by 0.5 percentage points. Finally, the monetary
authority’s relative weight on its price level target is set at ¾ = 3, which
is the value estimated, using US data, in the recent study by Broadbent
and Barro (1997).
19Column (1) of Table 2 shows the realized loss functions under
a currency union and alternative exchange rate regimes in the case of a
pure asymmetric productivity shock: a = ¡a¤ = 1. We see that the loss
under a currency union is the same as that under a symmetric peg; it is
more severe than under ‡exible exchange rates, the leadership position
in an asymmetric …x or in a cooperative system but the currency union
does outperform the follower position in an asymmetric …x. However, the
range of outcomes across all the regimes is not too variable, indicating
that the nominal exchange regime is not too important for adjustment to
asymmetric productivity shocks.
A national productivity shock is considered in column (2): a =
1; a = 0. This case has elements of both an aggregate shock (a + a¤ =
a = 1) and an asymmetric shock (a¡a¤ = 1¡0 = 1). Here, the currency
union does better than a symmetric …x, for the reason that the currency
union responds to aggregate productivity disturbances but the symmetric
…x regime does not. Since the aggregate shock is the same as the national
shock, performance under a currency union is very similar to the leader
position in an asymmetric …x. The loss is only slightly larger if the home
country is the follower in an asymmetric …x. However, ‡oating exchange
rates and cooperation each generate smaller losses than the currency union
in this case.
We present results for a common productivity shock (a = a¤ = 1)
in column (3). As was previously mentioned, the currency union exactly
matches the performance of the cooperative regime and an asymmetric
…x in this case. Note that both leader and follower in an asymmetric …x
20enjoy the same outcome, since there is no con‡ict of interest in the case
of a common shock. Again, the currency union is inferior to ‡oating but
outshines a symmetric …x. Comparing across columns (1)-(3), it is clear
that aggregate productivity disturbances generate bigger losses under all
regimes than purely asymmetric shocks. The reason is that home and
foreign productivity shocks both destabilize the price level in the same
direction, augmenting the need for monetary policy intervention.
We turn to demand shocks in columns (4)-(6). Relative perfor-
mance across regimes is very similar in columns (4) and (5), for the reason
that only the asymmetric component of the national demand shock (col-
umn (5)) matters, since the aggregate element is absorbed by adjustment
in real interest rates. In either case, the currency union signi…cantly out-
performs the follower position in an asymmetric …x and is identical to a
symmetric …x. Floating and cooperation generate similar losses, which
are less than one third the loss under a currency union, and the leader
position in an asymmetric …x generates the smallest loss by far. A purely
asymmetric demand shock is more costly under all regimes than a na-
tional shock, since a positive home shock and a negative foreign shock
each moves the price level in the same direction, which is a destabilizing
pattern. Finally, from column (6), a common demand shock is fully ab-
sorbed in real interest rates and so does not generate a loss, regardless of
the monetary arrangements in place.
21B : Sensitivity to Parameter Values
In order to make comparisons of the stabilization performances




LJ J = FLEX; LEAD; FOLL; SY MM; COOP
These ratios express the value of the loss function of the monetary au-
thority under a currency union in proportion to that experienced under
alternative arrangements. We examine the e¤ects of varying the “integra-
tion” parameters ¯, ± and ¾ for the four scenarios of asymmetric, national
and common productivity shocks, plus asymmetric demand shocks. It is
important to be clear that we analyze the impact of variation in these pa-
rameters, conditional on the occurrence of these various types of shocks.
In other words, we treat the size and asymmetry of shocks as exogenous.
In contrast, Frankel and Rose (1996) treat the international correlation
of shocks as endogenous and speculate that greater integration may make
shocks more symmetric across members of a currency union. While rec-
ognizing the importance of this issue, our focus here, for tractability, is on
stabilization performance conditional on the occurrence of various types
of shocks.
In Figure 1, we consider the e¤ects on relative performance of
varying ¯, the import share in consumption, over the range [0:01¡0:495].
An increase in ¯ indicates a diminished home bias in consumption pat-
terns, which is one possible dimension of greater economic integration. In
22the model, an increase in ¯ raises the sensitivity of the price level to the
value of the real exchange rate and hence ampli…es the spillover between
home and foreign monetary policies.
From [22]-[23] and [38]-[39], an increase in ¯ has no impact on
the relative performance of a currency union versus an asymmetric …x
in the cases of asymmetric, national or common productivity shocks.
CUSY MM falls in ¯ in the event of a national productivity shock but
is otherwise independent of ¯. However, CUFLEX is rising in ¯ for all
types of productivity shocks but is falling in ¯ in the case of an asym-
metric demand shock. CUCOOP behaves similarly to CUFLEX, with
the exceptions of national and common productivity shocks. In the for-
mer case, CUCOOP is non-monotonic in ¯ but converges to unity as the
consumption home bias is eliminated; in the latter case, we know that
the currency union and cooperative regimes deliver the same outcome in
response to a common productivity shock.10
The impact of a change in ±, the elasticity of output demand with
respect to the real exchange rate, on the relative performance of di¤erent
regimes is presented in Figure 2, which varies ± over the range [0:2¡1:0].
A high value of ± can be interpreted as implying that the two countries are
producing goods that are close substitutes; a low value of ±, that the goods
are poor substitutes. The e¤ect of greater integration on ± is ambiguous. If
integration causes countries to converge in terms of production structure,
± will increase; if integration fosters greater specialization at a regional
10In addition, we know that an asymmetric …x also generates the same outcome in this
case. A symmetric …x generates lower welfare but the di¤erence is independent of ¯. For
clarity, we only graph ratios that actually are sensitive to the parameter in question.
23level, on the other hand, ± may fall (see Krugman 1990).
Under either an asymmetric or a national productivity shock,
CUFLEX and CUCOOP are declining in ±. In both cases, CULEAD
…rst falls then rises as ± increases. CUFOLL displays an opposite pattern
under an asymmetric shock but is strictly falling in ± in the latter case,
while CUSY MM is rising in ± in the case of a national productivity shock.
Again, ± only a¤ects CUFLEX in the case of a common productivity
shock and the impact of rising ± is negative in this case. Finally, in the
case of an asymmetric demand shock, it is noteworthy that, in addition to
CUSY MM, CULEAD and CUFOLL are also invariant to changes in ±:
the relative comparison between a currency union and an asymmetric …x
in responding to asymmetric demand shocks is una¤ected by variation in
±. However, both CUFLEX and CUCOOP are rising in ± in this case.
It is noteworthy that a rise in ± or ¯ has opposite e¤ects on
CUFLEX and CUCOOP, depending on whether asymmetric produc-
tivity or demand shocks are being considered. The reason is that, in
order to achieve stabilization, both countries wish to expand employment
in the former case but adjust employment in opposite directions in the
latter case.
The sensitivity of the relative performance of a currency union
to variation in ¾, the relative weight placed by the monetary authority
on price level volatility in its loss function, is examined in Figure 3. This
parameter is of central importance in models of in‡ation determination.
For instance, Rogo¤ (1985b) recommends appointing a central banker
with a value of ¾ higher than the social value of ¾ in order to achieve
24a lower average in‡ation outcome. In our model, in contrast, there is
no in‡ation bias. Since ¾ both conditions policy responses to shocks
and determines the costliness of price level volatility in the monetary
authority’s loss function, it is unsurprising that ¾ has a non-monotonic
impact on relative welfare in a number of scenarios in Figure 3. These
include each comparison under an asymmetric productivity shock and
CULEAD and CUFOLL under a national productivity shock as well. In
the latter case, CUFLEX and CULEAD are both rising in ¾. In the case
of a common productivity shock, CUFLEX is rising and CUSY MM is
falling in ¾. CUFLEX, CUCOOP and CULEAD are each declining,
but CUFOLL is rising, in ¾ in the case of an asymmetric demand shock.
In summary, the results in this section indicate that stabilization
performance in a currency union, relative to other exchange rate arrange-
ments, can be systemically related to key “integration” parameters. In
the core case of asymmetric demand shocks, one dimension of greater
economic integration — more similar consumption patterns — tends to
reduce the relative unattractiveness of a currency union. If Krugman
(1990) is correct in predicting that integration will also lead to greater
specialization in production, such that ± falls, the relative performance of
a currency union in coping with asymmetric demand shocks is also im-
proved via this channel. However if greater integration rather leads to
greater substitutability between home and foreign goods, greater integra-
tion will make currency union less attractive, in terms of its stabilization
properties in the face of asymmetric demand shocks. Finally, in this con-
text, a larger value for ¾ makes currency union relatively less unattractive
25to the leader in an asymmetric …x and relatively more unattractive to the
follower. This is consistent with the political economy of the European
negotiations, with Germany demanding that price stability be paramount
among the ECB’s policy objectives. It is important to reiterate that this
result is generated only by stabilization considerations, since an in‡ation
bias is not present in the model.
Section VI: Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed monetary stabilization policy
in a currency union. We have shown that the optimal monetary policy
response to asymmetric demand shocks in a currency union is to do noth-
ing. As a consequence, an asymmetric demand shock feeds directly into
the real exchange rate and regional price levels and causes a realloca-
tion between domestic and foreign output and employment. However, we
also show that it is optimal to respond to positive aggregate productivity
shocks by expanding monetary policy.
In addition, we compared outcomes under a currency union to
those under alternative exchange rate systems, in order to obtain a sense
of the relative performance of a currency union. We showed that the rela-
tive stabilization performance under a currency union, versus alternative
exchange rate arrangements, is sensitive to the values of some key “inte-
gration” parameters but that the impact of variation in these parameters
may be quite di¤erent e¤ects depending on whether demand or productiv-
ity shocks are being considered. In the case of asymmetric demand shocks,
greater economic integration in terms of more similar consumption pat-
26terns tends to reduce the relative unattractiveness of a currency union in
terms of its stabilization properties; a similar story applies if integration
leads to greater specialization in production. Finally, another important
result in terms of stabilization performance in the face of asymmetric
demand shocks is that the relative unattractiveness of a currency union
declines, the larger is the relative weight placed on price stability versus
employment stability in the monetary authority’s objective function.
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Fig. 1: Sensitivity to ¯.








































































































Fig. 2: Sensitivity to ±.







































































































































































Fig. 3: Sensitivity to ¾.
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